Improving the Chilean College Admissions System

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In this paper we present the design and implementation of a new system to solve the Chilean college
admissions problem. We develop an algorithm that obtains all pairs applicant/program that can be part of
a stable allocation when preferences are not strict and when all students tied in the last seat of a program
(if any) must be allocated. We use this algorithm to identify which mechanism was used in the past to
perform the allocation, and we propose a new method to incorporate the affirmative action that is part of the
system to correct the inefficiencies that arise from having double-assigned students. By unifying the regular
admission with the affirmative action, we have improved the allocation of approximately 2.5% of students
assigned every year since 2016. From a theoretical standpoint we show that some desired properties, such as
strategy-proofness and monotonicity, cannot be guaranteed under flexible quotas.

Key words: college admissions, stable assignment, flexible quotas, non-strict preferences.

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1. Introduction

A centralized mechanism to match students to programs[1] has been used in Chile since the late

1960's by the *Departamento de Evaluación, Medición y Registro Educacional* (DEMRE), the ana-

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logue of the American College Board. Every year more than 250,000 students participate in the system, which includes more than 1,400 programs in 41 universities. This system has two main[2] components: a regular admission track, where all students that graduated from high-school can participate; and an affirmative action policy, that aims to benefit underrepresented groups by offering them reserved seats and economic support. More specifically, to be considered for the reserved seats and the scholarship—called *"Beca de Excelencia Academica"*, or simply BEA—a student must belong to the top 10% of his class, must graduate from a public/voucher school, and his family income must be among the lowest four quintiles of the national income distribution.

When the affirmative action was introduced in 2007, the procedure to match students to programs relied on a black-box software that could not be updated to incorporate this new feature. Hence, the authorities decided that the admission of BEA students would be run after the admission of regular students. Since BEA students can apply to both regular and reserved seats,[3] running the process sequentially introduces inefficiencies. For instance, a BEA student can be assigned to two different programs, and the seat that this student decides not to take cannot be re-allocated to another student. Due to this problem more than 1,000 vacancies were not filled every year, mainly affecting students from under-represented groups.

In this paper we provide a "reverse-engineering" approach to correct these inefficiencies. The reason why we start from the current system and we do not simply propose a complete re-design is that DEMRE wanted to keep the current rules and incorporate the reserved seats keeping the system as close as possible to its current state. Hence, there were two practical challenges to address: (1) to identify the mechanism that was currently being used, and (2) to modify this mechanism to unify the admission tracks. To address these challenges and eliminate the aforementioned inefficiencies, our first goal was to identify the mechanism "inside the black-box". Based on the rules of the system, we had enough evidence to think that the desired outcome was a stable matching. In addition, we realized that, unlike other systems, all students tied in the last seat had to be admitted, so quotas had to be *flexible* in order to allocate them. With these features in mind, we implemented

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an algorithm based on Baïou and Balinski (2004) that obtains all pairs applicant/program that can be part of a stable assignment, along with two extreme allocations: the student-optimal and the university-optimal stable assignments. By comparing the results of our algorithm with the actual assignment of past years we found that the mechanism used was the university-proposing deferred acceptance, with the special feature of flexible quotas to allocate all tied students in the last seat. Furthermore, we show that, unlike the case with strict preferences, the Chilean mechanism is not strategy-proof nor monotone. Nevertheless, we argue that flexible quotas do not introduce a major strategic concern given the large size of the market.

After identifying the algorithm being used, our next goal was to integrate both systems in order to maximize the utilization of vacancies. To solve this problem we introduce a new approach where each type of seat (regular or reserved) is assumed to belong to a different program with its own capacity and requirements, and students benefited by the affirmative action can apply to both.

This research is the outcome of an ongoing multiyear collaboration with DEMRE (2012-2020), aiming to improve the Chilean college admissions system. All the solutions described in this paper were adopted and implemented starting in 2014 with a pilot phase. In 2015 the system switched to a student-optimal mechanism with flexible quotas, and in 2016 the unified allocation was finally adopted. Based on simulations in 2014-2015 and the results of the final implementation in 2016, we find that our implementation has improved the allocation of approximately 2.5% of the students assigned each year. Furthermore, our "white box" implementation made the admission process fully transparent and reduced the execution time from over 5 hours to a couple of minutes. This improvement in transparency and performance has allowed the evaluation and introduction of different policies (e.g. the inclusion of the high-school class rank as admission factor; see Larroucau et al. (2015), among others) that otherwise could not have been studied.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the Chilean tertiary education system and the college admissions process. In Section 3 we discuss the closest related literature. In Section 4 we develop a model that formalizes the problem, we describe the mechanisms and present their properties. We discuss the implementation in Section 5. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section 6.

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Article submitted to *Operations Research*; manuscript no. 1

2. The Chilean College Admissions System

Tertiary education in Chile is offered by 149 institutions,[4] which can be classified in three types: (i) Universities (60), which have the exclusive right to award academic degrees—Bachelor, Master and Doctorate—and offer academic programs that require a previous degree, such as Medicine and Law; (ii) Professional Institutes (IP) (43), which offer professional/technical programs that lead to a professional/technician qualification; and (iii) Technical Schooling Centers (CFT) (46), which exclusively offer vocational programs leading to a technician qualification. These institutions not only differ in the type of programs they offer, but also in their programs' duration[5] and their application requirements. In particular, IP and CFT only require a secondary education license for admission, and some Professional Institutes may select their students based on their grades during high-school. In contrast, most universities require students to take a series of standardized tests (*Prueba de Selección Universitaria* or PSU). These tests include Math, Language, and a choice between Science or History, providing a score for each of them. The performance of students during high-school gives two additional scores, one obtained from the average grade during high-school (*Notas de Enseñanza Media* or NEM) and a second that depends on the relative position of the student among his/her cohort (*Ranking de Notas* or Rank).[6]

The admissions process to these institutions is semi-centralized, with the most selective universities having their own centralized system and the remaining institutions carrying their admission processes independently. In the centralized system, which is organized by CRUCH,[7] students submit a single application list and a centralized algorithm simultaneously performs the allocation to all participating programs. To participate in this system universities must (i) certify their quality, (ii) guarantee that their controllers are non-profit organizations, and (iii) agree with the terms and conditions, such as publishing their requirements for admission, the number of seats offered for each program, among others. On the other hand, IP, CFT and the universities that are not part of the centralized system run their admissions independently.[8]

In this paper we focus on the centralized part of the system, whose timeline is summarized in Figure 1. The process starts in May, when each program defines the specific requirements that

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Figure 1 Timeline of the Centralized Process

must be met by applicants to be acceptable, such as minimum application score or minimum tests

scores. In addition, each program freely[9] defines the weights assigned to each score and also the

number of seats offered for (i) the regular process, where all students compete, and for (ii) the

special admission track related to the affirmative action policy (BEA process/track). Programs

have until October to update this information. In June students must register to take the PSU,

which takes place at the end of November. Scores are published by the end of December and, right

after this, the application process starts. Students have 5 days to submit their list of preferences,

which can contain at most 10 different programs. These programs must be listed in strict order of

preference.

Each program's preference list is defined by first filtering out all applicants that do not meet

the specific requirements. Then, students are ordered in terms of their application scores, which

are computed as the weighted sum of the applicants' scores and the weights pre-defined by each

program. Note that two candidates can obtain the same application score, and therefore programs'

preferences are not necessarily strict.

Considering the preference lists of applicants and programs, as well as the number of seats

offered in both admission tracks, DEMRE runs an assignment algorithm to match students and

programs. Specifically, the regular process is solved first considering all applications and the regular

seats. Once the regular process is done, the BEA process is solved considering the reserved seats,

the students shortlisted for the scholarship (BEA students), and their applications to programs

that (i) rank higher in their preference list than the program they were assigned in the regular

process (if any), and that (ii) wait-listed them in the regular process. As a result, BEA students

can result *double-assigned*, i.e., they can get assigned to a program in the regular process and to

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another—strictly preferred—program in the BEA process. DEMRE reports both allocations, and double-assigned students are allowed to enroll in any of their two assigned programs.

DEMRE performs the matching for both processes using a black-box software for which no information is available regarding the specific algorithm used. Instead, the following description is provided for the regular process:[10]

> "SORTING OF APPLICANTS PER PROGRAM AND ELIMINATION OF MULTIPLE ALLOCA-TIONS:
>
> (a) Once the final application score is computed, candidates will be ordered in strict decreasing order based on their scores in each program.
>
> (b) Programs complete their vacancies starting with the applicant that is first in the list of candidates, and continue in order of precedence until seats are full.
>
> (c) If an applicant is selected in his first choice, then he is erased from the lists of his 2nd, 3rd, 4th, until his last preference. If he is not selected in his first choice, he is wait-listed and moves on to compete for his 2nd preference. If he is selected in this preference, he is dropped from the list of his 3rd to his 10th choice, and so on. In this way, it is possible that a student is selected in his 6th preference and wait-listed in his top five preferences; however, he will be dropped from the lists of his preferences 7th to 10th.
>
> (d) This procedure to select candidates is the result of an agreement between the universities to have a unified and integrated process, so that no student is admitted by more than one program. Nevertheless, a student can be wait-listed in more than one program if his score is not enough to be admitted.
>
> (e) All candidates that apply and satisfy the requirements of the corresponding program and institution will be wait-listed.
>
> THEREFORE, IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT APPLICANTS SELECT THEIR PROGRAMS IN THE SAME ORDER AS THEIR PREFERENCES".

This description suggests that the final allocation must be stable, in the sense that there is no pair student/program who simultaneously prefer to be matched together rather than to their matches in the proposed assignment. Indeed, as the results are public and students can easily check if their application scores are higher than that of the last student admitted in a program they prefer, legal problems may arise if the resulting matching was unstable. However, it is unclear from the description which specific stable assignment is implemented. Moreover, by analyzing the results of previous assignments we realized that, in case of a tie in the last seat of a program, the number of seats were increased in order to include all tied applicants. This feature of the system was confirmed

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by DEMRE, and applies to both admission tracks (regular and BEA). From now on we refer to this feature of the system as *flexible quotas*.[11]

The results of the assignment process are released by mid-January, and at this point the enrollment process starts. In its first stage, which lasts for three days, students can enroll in the programs they were assigned (either in the regular or in the BEA process). In its second stage, which lasts for one week, programs with seats left after the first stage can call students in their wait-lists and offer them the chance to enroll. This must be done in strict order of preference given by the application scores, and students must decline their enrollments in the first stage to enroll in a new program.[12] However, programs can decide not to call students if they have already filled a minimum number of regular seats,[13] and they are not forced to re-allocate unassigned BEA seats. By the rules of the system, all seats left after the second stage of enrollment are lost, including those seats not taken by students with double-assignments.[14] This is the main source of inefficiency that we address in this paper.

3. Literature Review

Centralized admission systems have been increasingly used in recent years to carry out the assignment of students to schools and colleges. A variety of mechanisms have been studied, including the celebrated Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley (1962)), the Immediate Acceptance (Boston) algorithm (Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005) and Ergin and Somnez (2006)) and the Top-Trading Cycles algorithm (Shapley and Scarf (1974)). An important part of the literature in market design has been devoted to characterize these mechanisms, mostly focusing on canonical examples that illustrate their properties. Another important body of the literature studies real life applications by combining the aforementioned mechanisms with specific rules such as restrictions in the length of preferences, tie breaking rules, affirmative actions, among many others. In this paper we try to contribute to both by studying the Chilean college admissions problem.

The most closely related paper to ours is Biró and Kiselgof (2015), which analyzes the college admissions system in Hungary, where all students tied in the lowest rank group of a program are

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rejected if their admission would exceed the quota. This mechanism is opposed to the Chilean case, where the quota is increased just enough so that all tied students are admitted. Biró and Kiselgof (2015) formalize these ideas by introducing the concepts of H-stability and L-stability, that correspond to the rules in Hungary and Chile, respectively. They also provide a natural adaptation of DA to compute H-stable and L-stable based on ascending score limits, and provide an alternative proof of the manipulability of H-stable and L-stable mechanisms. In a recent paper, Kamiyama (2017) presents a polynomial time algorithm to check whether a student can manipulate his preferences to obtain a better allocation. Our paper contributes to this strand of the literature by independently introducing the notion of L-stability, providing an algorithm based on Baïou and Balinski (2004) to find all pairs that may belong to a L-stable matching, and implementing it to solve a real, large and relevant problem.

Our paper is also related to the literature on affirmative action policies. Most of the research in this strand has focused on proposing mechanisms to solve the college admissions problem with diversity constraints and deriving properties such as stability, strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality. From a theoretical perspective, Echenique and Yenmez (2012) point out that the main tension between diversity concerns and stability is the existence of complementarities, although the theory requires substitutability for colleges' choices. Abdulkadiroğlu (2007) explores the Deferred Acceptance algorithm under type-specific quotas, and finds that the student-proposing DA is strategy proof for students if colleges' preferences satisfy responsiveness. Kojima (2012) shows that majority quotas may actually hurt minority students. Consequently, Hafalir et al. (2013) propose the use of minority reserves to overcome this problem, showing that the deferred acceptance algorithm with minority reserves Pareto dominates the one with majority quotas. Ehlers et al. (2014) extend the previous model to account for multiple disjoint types, and propose extensions of DA to incorporate soft and hard bounds. Other types of constraints are considered by Kamada and Kojima (2015), who study problems with distributional constraints motivated by the Japanese Medical Residency. The authors propose a mechanism that respects these constraints while satisfying other desirable properties such as stability, efficiency and incentives.

Some authors have recently analyzed the impact of the order in which reserves are processed. Dur et al. (2018) analyze the Boston school system and show that the precedence order in which seats are filled has important quantitative effects on distributional objectives. Dur et al. (2018) formalize our idea that processing reserved seats in a lower precedence order benefits BEA students. In a follow-up paper, Dur et al. (2020) characterize optimal policies when there are multiple reserve groups, and analyze their impact using Chicago's system data.

Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature on designing large-scale clearinghouses. Institutional details and special requirements oftentimes forbid the use of tools directly taken from the theory, and other engineering aspects become relevant in the design process (Roth 2002). Roth and Peranson (2002) report the design of a new clearinghouse to organize the labor market for new physicians in the United States. Since the new algorithm was finally adopted by the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in 1997, more than 20,000 doctors have been matched to entry level positions every year, and other labor markets have adopted the Roth-Peranson design, including Dental, Pharmacy and Medical Residencies (see Roth (2002) for other examples). In the school-choice context, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005) describe the design of a new mechanism to match entering students to public high-schools in New York. The new algorithm helped to dramatically reduce the number of students assigned to schools for which they had expressed no preference, and has motivated the implementation of centralized clearinghouses in other school districts (e.g. Boston, Amsterdam, New Orleans, Chicago, among others) and also nationwide (see Correa et al. (2019)). Closer to our setting, Baswana et al. (2019) describe the design and implementation of a clearinghouse to perform the allocation of students to technical universities in India. Their heuristic approach, which also allocates all tied students in the last seat and extends DA to accommodate the multiple types of seat reservations for affirmative action, has been successfully running since 2015.

4. Model

The following framework is assumed hereafter. Consider two finite sets of agents: programs $C = \{c_1, \ldots, c_m\}$ and applicants $A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$. Let $V \subseteq C \times A$ be the set of *feasible pairs*, with

$(c, a) \in V$ meaning that student a has submitted an application to program c and meets the specific requirements to be admissible in that program. A *feasible assignment* is any subset $\mu \subseteq V$. We denote by $\mu(a) = \{c \in C : (c, a) \in \mu\}$ the set of programs assigned to a and $\mu(c) = \{a \in A : (c, a) \in \mu\}$ the set of students assigned to program c. Each program c has a quota $q_c \in \mathbb{N}$ that limits the number of students that the program can admit. Moreover, program $c \in C$ ranks applicants according to a *total pre-order* $\leq_c$, i.e., a transitive relation in which all pairs of students are comparable. The indifference $a \sim_c a'$ denotes as usual the fact that we simultaneously have $a \leq_c a'$ and $a' \leq_c a$, and we write $a <_c a'$ when $a \leq_c a'$ but not $a \sim_c a'$. On the other side of the market, each applicant $a \in A$ ranks programs according to a *strict total order* $<_a$, i.e., for any programs c, c' such that $c >_a \emptyset$ and $c' >_a \emptyset$ (i.e., c, c' are acceptable to student a), we have either $c <_a c'$ or $c' <_a c$.

A *matching* is a feasible assignment $\mu \subseteq V$ such that, for each applicant a, the set of assigned programs $\mu(a)$ has at most one element, while for each program c the set of assigned students $\mu(c)$ has at most q_c elements. A matching μ is *stable* if for all pairs $(c, a) \in V \setminus \mu$ we have that either the set $\mu(a)$ has an element preferred over c in the strict order $<_a$, or the set $\mu(c)$ contains q_c elements preferred over a in the strict order $<_c$. In the first case, applicant a likes the match proposed by μ better than c, while in the second case the program has all its vacancies filled with students strictly preferred than a. If both conditions fail simultaneously, a and c would be better off by being matched together rather than accepting the assignment μ, in which case (c, a) forms a *blocking pair*. In other words, a matching is stable if it has no blocking pairs.

In their seminal paper, Gale and Shapley (1962) introduced the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm, which returns the stable matching that is most preferred by agents on the proposing side. Hence, by changing the proposing side, DA allows to find two extreme stable matchings: the student-optimal and the university-optimal. However, there are many reasons why the clearinghouse may want a stable outcome that is different from the extreme ones. For instance, the clearinghouse may be concerned about fairness (e.g. Teo and Sethuraman (1998) and Schwarz and Yenmez (2011)), or may prefer to benefit some specific agents in the market. In a recent

paper, Dworczak (2016) introduces the concept of Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains (DACC), which generalizes DA by allowing both sides of the market to propose. The author shows that a matching is stable if and only if it can be obtained through a DACC algorithm, and provides an algorithm that finds the stable matching given a sequence of proposers.

The aforementioned approach could be used to obtain all stable matchings by considering different sequences of proposers. However, this would require running the algorithm for each potential sequence, which is inefficient specially when the core of stable outcomes is relatively small. Therefore, we adopt an alternative approach and extend the algorithm introduced by Baïou and Balinski (2004), which uses a graph representation of the admissions problem. Following their approach, an *instance* of the college admissions problem can be fully described in terms of a pair $\Gamma = (G, q)$, where $G = (V, E)$ is an admission graph consisting of a set of feasible nodes V on a grid $C \times A$ and a set of directed arcs $E \subseteq V \times V$ that represent programs and applicants preferences; and q is a vector of quotas. Each row in the grid represents a program $c \in C$, and each column represents an applicant $a \in A$. The preferences of program c are encoded by horizontal arcs from (c, a) to (c, a') whenever $a \leq_c a'$, and those of student a by vertical arcs from (c, a) to (c', a) representing $c <_a c'$. For simplicity, the arcs that can be inferred by transitivity are omitted.

By exploiting this graph representation, the algorithm proposed by Baïou and Balinski (2004) recursively eliminates pairs $(c, a) \in V$ that are strictly dominated and thus cannot belong to any stable matching. More precisely, (c, a) is *a-dominated* if there are q_c or more applicants that have c as their top choice and dominate a in the strict preference order $<_c$. In this case, program c is guaranteed to fill its quota with applicants strictly above a, so that a has no chance to be assigned to c, and the pair (c, a) can be eliminated from further consideration.

Similarly, (c, a) is *c-dominated* if there is a program c' that places a among the top $q_{c'}$ applicants (*i.e.* less than $q_{c'}$ applicants are ranked strictly above a) and that is preferred by a over c, i.e., $c' >_a c$. In this case, applicant a is guaranteed to be assigned to a program ranked at least as high as program c' in his preference list, so the pair (c, a) cannot belong to any stable assignment.

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As a result, the algorithm returns a *domination-free subgraph* $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$, with node set $V^* \subseteq V$ that includes all nodes that are not strictly dominated. The domination free equivalent subgraph G^* contains all possible stable allocations, including the two most interesting (and extreme) cases: the *student-optimal* matching, μ_A^*, that assigns each applicant $a \in A$ to its best remaining choice in G^* (if any); and the *university-optimal* matching, μ_C^*, that assigns to each program $c \in C$ its q_c top choices in G^*. In this way, the algorithm by Baïou and Balinski (2004) returns the allocations that could be obtained using DA, but also the nodes that could potentially be in other stable outcomes.

In order to apply this mechanism to the Chilean case, we extend it to incorporate two special features: (1) the existence of ties and flexible quotas, and (2) the affirmative action policy. The next two sections describe how we incorporate these elements into the mechanism.

4.1. Ties and Flexible Quotas: FQ-matchings

Suppose now that programs' preferences may not be strict, and that programs are required to adjust their quotas to include all applicants tied in the last seat. More precisely, a program c may exceed its quota q_c only if the last group of students admitted are in a tie, and upon rejecting all these students c results with unassigned seats. We also impose a non-discrimination condition: an applicant a' who is tied with a student a admitted to a program c must himself be granted admission to c or to a more preferred program. The following definitions state these conditions formally.

DEFINITION 1. An assignment μ satisfies *quotas-up-to-ties* if, for each program c and each $a \in \mu(c)$, the set of strictly preferred students assigned to c satisfies $|\{a' \in \mu(c) : a' >_c a\}| < q_c$.

DEFINITION 2. An assignment μ satisfies *non-discrimination* if, whenever $a \in \mu(c)$ and $a' \sim_c a$ with $(c, a') \in V$, then $a' \in \mu(c')$ for some program $c' \geq_{a'} c$.

With these preliminary definitions we introduce our notion of matching, which requires in addition that each applicant is assigned to at most one program.

DEFINITION 3. A *matching with flexible quotas* (FQ-matching) is an assignment $\mu \subseteq V$ that satisfies quotas-up-to-ties, non-discrimination, and that each applicant $a \in A$ is assigned to at most one program, i.e., $\mu(a)$ has at most one element.

Finally, the presence of ties and flexible quotas requires to update the notion of stability.

DEFINITION 4. An FQ-matching μ is stable if it has no blocking pairs, i.e., there are no pairs $(c, a) \notin \mu$ such that

- $\mu(c)$ has less than q_c applicants that are *strictly* preferred than a, and,

- a prefers c over his current assingment $\mu(a)$.

To compute a stable FQ-matching we propose the following procedure. As in the algorithm by Baïou and Balinski (2004), we start by recursively removing all strictly dominated nodes, ensuring that students tied in the last place of a program are kept. Notice that the definitions of a-dominance and c-dominance directly extend to the case with ties and flexible quotas, as they involve strict dominance. Then, starting from the corresponding domination-free subgraph G^*, we can obtain a stable FQ-matching by assigning each student to a program. In particular, the two extreme allocations can be obtained by greedily assigning each student to his top preference (student-optimal) in G^*, or each program to its most desired q_c students including those tied in the last place (university-optimal).[15] Applying this procedure to the example in Figure 2a, we obtain the reduced graph G^* presented in Figure 2b and the extreme assignments: μ_A^* (light gray) and μ_C^* (gray). This example shows that the inclusion of a single tie may considerably change the outcome (see Appendix 5 in the Electronic Companion for a detailed discussion of this example and how it compares to the case with no ties).

In Appendix A.1 we formally describe the algorithm that was finally implemented (in 2016), which is a faster version as it only computes the student-optimal FQ-matching. To accomplish this, the algorithm recursively eliminates all nodes that are a-dominated, and later assigns each student to his top choice in the resulting sub-graph. This is a good alternative to other algorithms

Figure 2   Non-strict preferences

(a) Admission graph

(b) Optimal matchings

(e.g., DA or ascending score-limits (see Biró and Kiselgof (2015))) to compute the student-optimal assignment when quotas-up-to-ties and non-discrimination are required.

In Appendix 1 (in the Electronic Companion) we show that the aforementioned procedure results in a stable FQ-matching, and in Appendix 2 we show that the two extreme stable FQ-matchings are optimal, but they lack two important properties: monotonicity and strategy-proofness (SP).[16] The lack of strategy-proofness can be troublesome because it may induce agents to misreport their preferences strategically, giving an unfair advantage to more sophisticated students. However, we conjecture and argue that the mechanism is *strategy-proof in the large* (SP-L), which means that students find approximately optimal to submit their true preferences in a large market for any full support i.i.d. distribution of students' reports (see Azevedo and Budish (2018)). In fact, as Azevedo and Budish (2018) argue, the relevant distinction for practice in a large market is whether a mechanism is "SP-L vs not SP-L" and not "SP vs not SP", since students in a large market do not know what are the realized reports of every other student, so imposing optimality of truthful reporting against every report realization (as in SP) is too strong. Thus, the lack of strategy-proofness is not a problem in our setting. Finally, in Appendix 3 we describe how our definition of FQ-matching relates to other notions of stability, such as weak, strong, super and L-stability. Notice that if there are no ties in the preferences of programs non-discrimination holds trivially, while quotas-up-to-ties reduces to $|\mu(c)| \leq q_c$; hence, FQ-matching coincides with the standard notion of stable matching.

Overall, the implementation of a stable FQ-matching involves a trade-off between potentially exceeding capacities and obtaining a better allocation for students in the Pareto sense. If universities

do not want to arbitrarily discriminate students and their marginal cost of increasing their capacity is low enough, allowing for ties and flexible quotas can be a sensible policy because it translates to a Pareto improvement for students,[17] and it eliminates any fairness concerns that can arise due to tie breaking rules. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.3.1

4.2. Unifying Admission Tracks

Using the model described in the previous section we can directly include the affirmative action and solve both admission tracks (regular and BEA) simultaneously.

To accomplish this, we consider a unified admission instance $\Gamma^U = (G^U, q^U)$, where each program $c \in C$ is split into two virtual programs, c^R and c^B with q_c^R and q_c^B vacancies, that represent the regular and the BEA processes, respectively. The preferences of students that are not shortlisted for the scholarship remain unchanged. In contrast, each program in the preference list of a BEA student is also divided into the two virtual programs, giving a higher position in the preference list to the regular process, i.e., for any two programs c_1, c_2 such that $c_1 >_a c_2$, the new preference order is $c_1^R >_a c_1^B >_a c_2^R >_a c_2^B$. We decided to use this order because DEMRE wanted to prioritize BEA students. Then, by applying to the regular seats first, BEA students with good scores can be admitted in regular seats, reducing the competition for reserved seats and therefore weakly increasing the total number of BEA students admitted in the system. This idea is formalized in Dur et al. (2013) and recently extended to more reserve groups in Dur et al. (2020). In Appendix 1 (in the Electronic Companion) we show that every student is weakly better off compared to the sequential solution. We illustrate this in Example 1

EXAMPLE 1. Consider the admission graph in Figure 3a, and suppose that students a_1 and a_4 are shortlisted for the scholarship. In the sequential case the regular process is run first considering the admission graph G^R in Figure 3a and quotas $q_c = q_c^R$, resulting in the allocation $\mu(\Gamma^R) = \{(c_1, a_4), (c_1, a_5), (c_2, a_2)\}$.[18] Then, the BEA instance $\Gamma^B = (G^B, q^B)$ is built considering only the shortlisted students and their preferences where they were wait-listed in the regular process. Figure

Figure 3   Unified process

(a) Original admission graph G^R.

(b) BEA admission graph G^B.

(c) Unified admission graph G^U.

3b illustrates the corresponding graph G^B. The resulting allocation for the BEA process is $\mu(\Gamma^B) = \{(c_1, a_1), (c_2, a_4)\}$, and therefore student a_4 is assigned to c_1 in the regular process and to c_2 in the BEA process, while a_3 remains unassigned. Independently of which option is taken by a_4, a seat that could have been otherwise assigned to a_3 will be lost.

The unified graph of this problem is shown in Figure 3c. In this case we observe that there is a unique FQ-matching given by $\mu(\Gamma^U) = \{(c_1^R, a_3), (c_1^R, a_5), (c_1^B, a_1), (c_2^R, a_2), (c_2^B, a_4)\}$, i.e., all applicants are assigned and no seats are lost. More importantly, every student is indifferent or better off compared to the sequential assignment.

5. Implementation

In this section we report the results of the implementation of this project. We start providing a general description of the Chilean college admissions problem. Then, we describe the results of our first goal, which was to find the algorithm that has been used in Chile to perform the allocation. Finally, we close this section with the results of unifying the admission tracks and other additional side effects of this project.

5.1. General Description

In Table 1 we present general descriptives on the programs that are part of the centralized admission system. We observe that, between 2014 and 2016, the number of universities did not changed, while

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Table 1 General description — Programs

|	2014	2015	2016
Universities	33	33	33
Programs	1,419	1,423	1,436
Regular seats	110,380	105,516	105,513
Reserve seats	4,394	4,422	4,295

Figure 4 Evolution of Students Through Admission Process

(a) Regular

(b) BEA

the number of programs slightly increased. However, we see that the number of seats available decreased over the years.

To describe the other side of the market, in Figure 4 we present the number of regular and BEA students at each stage of the admission process (more details in Table 5, Appendix B). A *participant* is a student that registered to participate in the standardized national exam and that has at least one valid score.[19] Once the results of the national exam are published, participants have five days to submit their applications to the centralized clearinghouse. We refer to the students that apply to at least one program that is part of the centralized system as *applicants*. Finally, we refer to students that were admitted by a program that is part of the centralized system as *assigned*.

First, we observe that the total number of participants has increased over the years, reaching a total of 267,231 participants in 2016. Second, comparing the number of participants and the number of applicants we observe that close to half of the students that registered for the national

Figure 5   Distribution of applications per student

exam applied to programs that are part of the system. The main reason for this is that CRUCH

sets a minimum threshold of 450 points[20] for students to be eligible by any program that is part

of the system, and since tests are standardized to have mean 500, roughly half of the students will

not satisfy this admissibility condition.

Also related to the application process, in Figure 5 we show the distribution of applications per

student for each year. The median number of applications is 4, and the share of each number of

applications stays roughly constant across years. As students are restricted to submit a list with

no more than 10 programs, we observe that between 5% and 10% of applicants submit a full list

of 10 applications. Notice that some universities further restrict the number of programs to which

a student can apply, and also the position that an application can take in the applicant's list.[21]

Theoretically, any restriction on the length of the application list will break strategy-proofness.

Nevertheless, whether these constraints are binding or not in practice, and what the strategic

implications are for students, are questions for future research.

Regarding the assignment we observe that, although the number of admitted students has

increased, the system has become more competitive over the years, as more students participate

and slightly less vacancies are offered each year. In fact, the overall fraction of applicants that are

assigned to some program is close to 80% in 2014, while it goes down to 78% in 2015 and 70%

in 2016 (see Table 5 in Appendix B for details). On the other hand, Figures 6a and 6b show the

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Figure 6   Preference of assignment

(a) Regular   (b) BEA

distribution of the preference of assignment for regular and BEA students respectively. We see that close to 50% of students get assigned to their first reported preference, and close to 90% get assigned to one of their first three preferences. Although both regular and BEA students exhibit the same pattern of assignment, notice that the latter get assigned consistently more to their first preference compared to regular students.

Finally, in Table 6 in Appendix B we present detailed socio-demographic characteristics of the students that are assigned. The fact that around 23% of admitted students graduated from a private school is striking, considering that they represent only 12% of the total number of participants in the admission process. Similarly, students from the highest income group only represent 9% of the total number of participants, but they account for 18% of admitted students. These numbers shed some light on the huge inequalities in opportunities that characterize the Chilean college admission process.

The point of having reserve seats is to alleviate these inequalities and favor underrepresented groups. In Figure 7 we compare socio-demographic characteristics of students that were assigned in the admission process of 2016, separating between regular and BEA applicants. We observe that the fraction of female students is higher in the BEA group. In addition, we observe that the fraction of students with low income levels and from public schools is also higher in the BEA group. These results suggest that the affirmative action has a positive effect at providing more opportunities to these under-represented groups.

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Figure 7   Characteristics of Assigned Applicants - Regular vs. BEA

5.2. Identifying the Current Mechanism

Our first goal was to identify which mechanism has been used to solve the Chilean college admissions problem. After implementing the algorithm described in Section 4.1 and including all the constraints that are part of the system, we solved the admission instances from 2012 to 2014, comparing the FQ-student-optimal and FQ-university-optimal allocations with the official results obtained using DEMRE's black box. Based on these comparisons, the rules of the system, and evidence provided by DEMRE, we concluded that the allocation used is equivalent to the university-optimal FQ-matching, as the results are exactly the same for all the years considered.

Given that our algorithm returns the student-optimal and the university-optimal FQ-matchings for each instance, we can easily compare these two extreme allocations. Indeed, we find that the number of differences between these two allocations has been at most 10 (pairs student/program) since 2012. This suggests that the size of the core of stable assignments in the Chilean case is rather small, supporting the theoretical results in Roth and Peranson (2002) and Ashlagi et al. (2017).

Even though the number of differences is small, we proposed DEMRE to adopt an student-optimal FQ-matching because it benefits some students and, more importantly, because it is a message for students that the mechanism aims to give them the best possible allocation. DEMRE agreed with this view, and after a pilot version in 2014 they adopted the student-optimal version of our algorithm to perform the allocation in 2015.

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Table 2   Impact of Unified Assignment 2014-2016

	2014	2015	2016
Double Assigned	1,100	1,180	1,127
Improvements	1,737	1,915	1,749
New Assigned	568	672	777

5.3. Integrating Admission Tracks

Having identified the algorithm that is used to perform the allocation, our second goal was to integrate the admission tracks in order to alleviate the aforementioned inefficiencies.[22] To accomplish this, we implemented the framework described in Section 4.2 and we ran it as a trial version during the admission processes of 2014 and 2015. Based on the results, we convinced DEMRE to adopt our unified student-optimal FQ-matching in 2016, and this allocation has been the official mechanism used since then. In this section we report the results from our simulations (2014 and 2015), and the actual impact of our implementation in 2016.

In Table 2 we present a summary of the results. The first row presents the number of students that would have been double-assigned under the old system. The second row presents the number of students that improved their assignment compared to the old system. Finally, the third row shows the number of students that are assigned to some program under the new system and were not assigned in the old system. We observe that the number of students that benefit from unifying the admission tracks is larger than the number of seats lost due to double-assignments. The reason is that a student that directly benefits releases a seat that can be used by another student, who in turn allows another student to take his old seat, and so on. This chain of improvements eventually ends either because there are no students wait-listed in that program, or because they reach a student who was unassigned and therefore does not release another seat. Overall, we observe that around 2.5% of students who were admitted to a program in the system benefited from our implementation, and this number is relatively constant across years.

Improving the assignment of students is relevant because the probability of enrollment is increasing in the preference of assignment,[23] and most programs in the system have positive and high

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Figure 8   Benefits of unifying the admission tracks - 2016

(a) Improvements   (b) New assigned

expected returns, which are measured in terms of the net present value of future earnings over the life cycle after graduation (see Lara et al. (2017)). Moreover, there is evidence that students that were assigned in low listed preferences have a higher probability of switching and dropping out from their programs, leading to lower on-time graduation rates (see Larroucau and Rios (2020)).

In Figure 8 we plot the benefits of unifying the admission tracks in 2016, measured in terms of preferences of assignment. For students who improve their assignment, in Figure 8a we plot the distribution of the magnitude of their improvement based on their preference list. We observe that most students improve their allocation by getting assigned to the program listed immediately above the program they were previously assigned (improvement equal to 1). On the other hand, in Figure 8b we show the preference of assignment for those students who would not have been assigned under the old system but that result assigned by the new system. Most of these students benefit from the unified allocation by getting assigned to their top choice. A potential reason for these results is that an important fraction of these students apply to less than three programs.

We provide more details on the students that benefit from unifying the admission tracks in Table 7 (see Appendix B). We first observe that most of the students that benefit from unifying the admission tracks are regular students. For instance, a total of 2,526 students benefited from the change in the algorithm in 2016 (see Table 2), among which 2,405 are regular students and 121 are BEA students. The reason is that seats that were dropped by a BEA student with double

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Figure 9   Characteristics of Students that Benefit - Improvements vs. New Assigned, Regular Students, 2016

assignment are now used by other students, and this generates improvement chains that reach other (mostly regular) students. In addition, in Figure 9 we compare some characteristics of those who improve (*Improvements*) with those who get assigned and would not under the old system (*New Assigned*) among regular students in the admission process of 2016. We observe that the latter group has lower scores and a larger fraction of students who come from lower income families. Moreover, from Table 7 we observe that the fraction of female students is higher among *New Assigned* students compared to the group *Improvements.* The reason for this is that students who improved were also assigned under the old system, while those from the *New Assigned* group were not. Therefore, students from the *Improvements* group have on average higher scores, and these are positively correlated with family income.

The differences in terms of scores and demographics are also present if we compare these groups with the overall group of assigned students described in Table 6 (in Appendix B). Indeed, previously assigned students have on average higher scores and higher family income than students that were benefited by the unified assignment. For instance, the share of assigned students coming from private high-schools was about 24% for regular students, while it was close to 18% and 14% for students in the groups of *Improvements* and *New Assigned*, respectively.

Another interesting result is that most of BEA students are assigned to regular seats, and more than half of the reserve seats remains unfilled (before the enrollment process begins), and this pattern continues even after the implementation of the unified system (see Tables 1 and 5). Indeed,

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we proposed DEMRE to transfer the unfilled reserve seats to students from the regular process, but they declined because some universities "were not open to this option".[24]

5.3.1. Effect of Flexible Quotas One of the most distinctive features of the Chilean case is the use of flexible quotas. This approach belongs to the general category of *equal treatment policies* (Biró and Kiselgof 2015), where all tied students whose admission would exceed a program's capacity are either accepted or rejected, as it is the case in Chile and Hungary, respectively. An alternative approach is to break ties using a combination of randomness and administrative rules, as it is the case in most school districts and in many college admissions settings, such as in Spain, Turkey, Germany, France, among others. A special case of these tie-breaking rules are those that exclusively depend on randomization, such as the *single tie-breaking* (STB) and *multiple tie-breaking* (MTB).[25] Which approach to use is a relevant design decision, and it heavily depends on the characteristics of the problem.

We identify three dimensions that could help in guiding this decision. First, the nature of agents' preferences plays a critical role. Indeed, if preferences are fine enough so that the number of ties is relatively small, the benefits of having flexible quotas—non-discrimination and better allocation for students in the Pareto sense—may outweigh its costs—exceeding capacities. This would be the case in most college admissions settings, where preferences are built based on scores from exams and/or grades. In contrast, when preferences are rather coarse (e.g., in school choice settings with a limited number of priority groups) having flexible quotas may lead to large violations of initial capacities, which could make its implementation unfeasible. Second, the level of heterogeneity in students' preferences is also relevant, as it prevents that a small number of programs concentrate most of the ties. Finally, a last element to consider is whether the allocation depends on factors that are perceived as relevant to the process. For example, waiting times for public housing, the condition of a patient for organ transplants, or exam scores in college admissions are generally considered as fair factors, so using random tie-breakers may be considered arbitrary and discriminatory. In fact, the use of random orders to break ties in the admission process to high-schools in Chile (see Correa

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Table 3   Impact of Flexible Quotas vs. H-stability

	2014	2015	2016
Extra Seats	61	89	67
Programs with flexible quotas	53	79	59
Maximum number of flexible quotas	2	3	3
Benefits compared to H-stability			
Improvements	124	317	212
New Assigned	68	134	99
Total	192	451	311

et al. (2019)) has generated a strong debate, with their opponents arguing that some measure of academic achievement should be considered instead.[26]

To illustrate the effect of having flexible quotas, we compare the official assignments to the results that would be obtained if ties were handled with other approaches. To our knowledge this is the first paper to compare equal treatment policies with random tie-breakers, and thus contributes to the literature that compares STB and MTB empirically (see Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2009) and de Haan et al. (2015)) and theoretically (see Ashlagi et al. (2019) and Arnosti (2015)).

In Table 3 we report the number of extra seats required as a result of flexible quotas, and how these are distributed across programs. We observe that the number of additional seats created is small (maximum of 89 seats in 2015), which represents less than 0.1% of the total number of seats for each year. In addition, we observe that these seats are evenly spread across programs, as the maximum number of seats created by a given program is 3. Hence, we conclude that having flexible quotas does not involve a large cost for programs.

Table 3 also reports the number of students that benefit from having flexible quotas compared to a H-stable mechanism (Biró and Kiselgof 2015), i.e., one that rejects all tied students whose admission would exceed the program's capacity. The first group—*Improvements*—includes students that improve their assignment, while the second—*New Assignments*—considers students who are

Table 4   Impact of Flexible Quotas vs. Random Tie-Breaking

Benefits from Flexible Quotas

	STB			MTB		
	2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
Improvements	89.4	161.8	110.9	88.5	162.4	111.3
	(5.4)	(7.1)	(5.8)	(5.6)	(8.1)	(5.6)
New Assigned	32.1	63.9	52.4	31.9	63.8	52.2
	(2.0)	(2.3)	(1.6)	(2.0)	(2.3)	(1.7)
Total	121.6	225.6	163.3	120.5	226.2	163.6
	(5.0)	(6.4)	(5.9)	(4.8)	(7.7)	(5.8)

assigned to some program in the official assignment (with flexible quotas) and would not be assigned under the alternative mechanism. Similarly, in Table 4 we summarize the benefits from having flexible quotas compared to breaking ties randomly using STB and MTB. These results are obtained from 100 simulations for each tie-breaking rule and, as before, we separate the students that benefit in two groups: improvements and new assignments.

As expected, all students weakly prefer their allocation under flexible quotas, and a significant number of students strictly prefers it compared to H-stability, STB and MTB. In addition, we observe that the average number of students that benefit from flexible quotas largely exceeds the number of extra seats created, with between 2 and 3 students benefiting from each extra seat. Among these, we find that roughly 2/3 are students who improve their assignment, while 1/3 are students who would not be assigned if a random tie-breaker were used. All these results suggest that having flexible quotas benefits an important number of students without generating a substantial cost for programs, and we expect to find similar patterns in other college admissions systems that are similar to the Chilean case, such as those in Hungary, Turkey, and Spain. In Appendix C we further compare flexible quotas with other approaches that combine tie-breaking rules (STB and MTB) with increasing vacancies to match those resulting from flexible quotas, and we find that flexible quotas still outperform these benchmarks.

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5.4. Additional Side Effects

In terms of running times, our implementation considerably outperforms the algorithm previously used by DEMRE. In fact, their black-box software takes up to 5 hours to return the final assignment, while our implementation solves the problem in less than 2 minutes on a standard laptop. This time reduction has had a significant impact since it allows to evaluate different policy changes in the system, such as the inclusion of new admission criteria, the impact of new instruments, and the redesign of affirmative action policies. In particular, the new algorithm was used to evaluate the effect of including the high-school class rank as an admission factor through simulations changing the conditions in which this new instrument is included (Larroucau et al. (2015)). Furthermore, the efficiency gains have opened other directions for future research, involving the evaluations of policies that could stress the system in the future. For instance, the impact of modifying the constraints on the size of the list or the weights on the admission factors, the inclusion of score bonuses for first time applicants or penalties for re-applicants, and the implementation of admission quotas for underrepresented groups. The evaluation of these policies was not possible in the past due to the computational time involved.

6. Conclusions

We investigate how the Chilean college admissions system works. There are two main features that make the Chilean system different from the classic college admissions problem: (i) preferences of colleges are not strict, and all students tied for the last seat of a program must be assigned; and (ii) the system considers an affirmative action that is solved sequentially after the regular process. Students who benefit from the affirmative action can be double-assigned, introducing a series of inefficiencies in the assignment and enrollment processes. Even though the authorities were aware of this problem, they could not solve it because they relied on a black-box software that could not be updated to incorporate the affirmative action.

To identify which mechanism was used, we developed an algorithm that finds all pairs applicant/program that can be part of a stable allocation satisfying the rules of the system, i.e., flexible

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quotas and non-discrimination of tied students. We also introduced the notion of FQ-matching to account for these features, and we characterized its main properties. We showed that this mechanism leads to the optimal stable allocations satisfying flexible quotas and non-discrimination, but it lacks monotonicity and strategy-proofness. Nevertheless, we argue that this should not be a concern considering the large size of the market, which makes practically impossible for students to benefit from manipulating their preferences to leverage the presence of ties and flexible quotas.

By comparing the results of our algorithm with historical data, we found that the algorithm that had been used in the past is a variant of the university-optimal stable assignment that satisfies flexible quotas and non-discrimination. Even though the number of differences is small, we convinced DEMRE to switch to the student-optimal FQ-matching, which was finally adopted in 2015 after a pilot version in 2014.

Having identified the algorithm, we proposed a new method to incorporate the affirmative action by treating regular and reserve seats as different programs. The unified approach to solve the problem was adopted and implemented by DEMRE in 2016, after two years of analyzing its potential impact. The results of the implementation in 2016, as well as the pilot results in 2014 and 2015, show that around 2.5% of the total number of students that are admitted each year benefit from the unified assignment. Among the students who actually benefited in 2016, 30.8% would not have been assigned to any program under the old system, and 69.2% are students who improved compared to what they would get under the old system. The benefited students have, on average, lower scores and lower family income compared to the students that would have been assigned under the old system. Thus, the unified approach reduces both the inefficiencies of the mechanism and the inequality in the system.

In addition to its direct impact on students, the efficiency of our algorithm reduced the running time by two orders of magnitude relative to the old system, enabling to perform simulations to evaluate different policies oriented to make the admission process more fair and inclusive. Finally, our method helped to improve the transparency of the system, and allowed other changes to be implemented on top of it.

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Certainly there are many directions for future work. While working on this project we realized that many students do not apply to programs where their chances of admission are too low, even though the constraint on the length of their preference list is not binding. Hence, considering their reports as truthful would lead to serious biases in the estimation of preferences, leading to wrong evaluations of policies. We are currently working on a model of preferences that takes this fact into account (see Larroucau and Rios (2019)). Another direction that emerged from this project is on trying to understand why some students apply to programs where they have no chance of getting admitted as they don't satisfy the requirements to be eligible. We are currently working on understanding why this is the case, and designing changes to the application process aiming to reduce mistaken reports. Finally, another research question that arose from this project is how to modify the mechanism to better elicit the intensity of students' preferences, and use this to improve students' retention and on time graduation rates (see Larroucau and Rios (2020)).

Overall, we hope that the current results encourage the Chilean authorities to keep improving the system, and that they motivate other college systems around the world to evaluate and adopt flexible quotas, as this would increase the overall efficiency of the processes and it would also improve the welfare of students.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Algorithm

A.1. Faster algorithm for FQ-matchings

An observation that might be exploited to improve the algorithm described in Section 4.1 is that not all dominated nodes need to be removed. Indeed, a natural approach is to drop only those nodes that are causing violations of the properties of the assignment, e.g., stability, quotas-up-to-ties and non-discrimination. This is similar to the strategy used in the deferred-acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962).

We describe the idea for the student-optimal FQ-matching μ_A. For each program c we set up an ordered list L_c in which we will sequentially add and remove applicants. Initially $L_c = \emptyset$. For each $a \in A$ we set a pointer t_a to its most preferred program and, if this pointer is not null, we push a into a stack S that contains the applicants with no program assigned yet.

We iterate as follows. We pop a student a from the stack S and insert it in the ordered list L_c of the most preferred program c. If $|L_c|$ exceeds q_c, we check quotas-up-to-ties and eventually remove the last group of students in L_c to ensure that this property holds, by using the following procedure.

CHECK-QUOTAS-UP-TO-TIES: Find the set T_c of applicants tied in the last position in L_c. If $|L_c| \leq q_c + |T_c|$ we keep the list as it is, otherwise each node (c, a') for $a' \in T_c$ is a-dominated so we remove a' from L_c and update $t_{a'}$ to its next most preferred program $c' <_{a'} c$. If such c' exists we push a' back into the stack S and otherwise we leave a' unassigned. If the tie T_c is removed then $|L_c|$ reduces its size by $|T_c|$.

Algorithm 1 Fast student-optimal FQ-matching

1: Read instance Γ

2: Initialize $L_c = \emptyset$ for all c and stack $S = A$

3: **while** (S is non-empty) **do**

4:     $a \leftarrow \text{pop}(S)$

5:     $c \leftarrow t_a$

6:     Insert a into L_c

7:     **if** ($|L_c| > q_c$) **then**

8:         CHECK-QUOTAS-UP-TO-TIES

9:     **end if**

10: **end while**

11: **return** Assignment μ_A represented by the final lists L_c

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Appendix B: Additional Results

Table 5 General description — students

		Regular			BEA		
		2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
Participants		228,318	241,873	250,320	15,990	16,710	16,911
Applicants		108,144	113,900	129,896	11,017	11,688	12,010
Assigned	Regular seats	86,048	87,466	90,741	9,520	10,154	8,886
	Reserve seats	-	-	-	1,325	1,404	1,345

Table 6 General description — Assigned

		Regular			BEA		
		2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
Assigned	Total	86,048	87,466	90,741	9,745	10,378	10,231
Gender	Female	49.5%	49.5%	50.2%	57.6%	58.4%	59.5%
Average Scores	Math/Verbal[1]	588	589.3	588.7	591.1	595.9	593.4
	NEM[2]	586	588.4	592	696.8	696.7	700.5
	Rank[3]	608.7	614.4	615.5	770.6	776.9	774.5
Income[4]	[0, $288]	28.8%	26.4%	23.5%	46%	42.6%	40.9%
	($288, $576]	26.7%	27.5%	29%	34.6%	37.1%	38.6%
	($576, $1,584]	26.8%	27.5%	28.9%	18.7%	19.5%	19.1%
	> $1,584	17.8%	18.6%	18.7%	0.7%	0.8%	1.4%
High-School	Private	23.4%	23.4%	22.5%	0%	0%	0%
	Voucher[5]	52.4%	52.9%	53.3%	60.7%	61%	61.4%
	Public	24.2%	23.7%	24.1%	39.3%	39%	38.6%

[1] Score constructed with the average Math score and Verbal score. For students using scores from previous year, we considered the maximum of both averages.
[2] Score constructed with the average grade along high-school.
[3] Score constructed with the relative position of the student among his/her classmates.
[4] Gross Family monthly income in thousands Chilean pesos (nominal).
[5] Partially Subsidized schools.

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Table 7 General description — impact of unifying admission tracks

| | | Improvements | | | | | | New Assigned | | | | | |
| | | Regular | | | BEA | | | Regular | | | BEA | | |
		2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
Assigned	Total	1,592	1,791	1,640	145	124	109	548	647	765	20	25	12
Gender	Female	47.2%	44.4%	45.7%	66.9%	60.5%	62.4%	52.2%	47.9%	51.6%	65%	68%	58.3%
Average Scores	Math/Verbal[1]	584.2	582	579.7	579.8	573.7	584.1	560.8	551.2	548.2	564.8	561	558
	NEM[2]	577.8	576.9	575	686	675.7	691.1	540	538.9	538.4	677.1	658	689.2
	Rank[3]	600.2	600.6	596.1	755.8	752.9	770	554.8	556.4	553.5	753.2	734	764.1
Income[4]	[$0, $288]	28.1%	27.4%	25.2%	48.3%	41.9%	48.6%	30.1%	32.3%	28.8%	60%	36%	75%
	($288, $576]	30.2%	29%	31.3%	29.7%	39.5%	37.6%	34.5%	32.9%	34%	25%	32%	8.3%
	($576, $1,584]	27.4%	29.3%	28.5%	20%	18.5%	13.8%	26.1%	24.3%	28.8%	15%	32%	16.7%
	> $1,584	14.3%	14.3%	14.9%	2.1%	0%	0%	9.3%	10.5%	8.5%	0%	0%	0%
High-School	Private	18.4%	18.6%	16.2%	0%	0%	0%	13.8%	14.5%	13.4%	0%	0%	0%
	Voucher[5]	56.7%	57.3%	56.7%	63.4%	61.3%	65.1%	59.5%	61.4%	61.5%	60%	72%	58.3%
	Public	24.9%	24.2%	27.1%	36.6%	38.7%	34.9%	26.7%	24.1%	25%	40%	28%	41.7%

[1] Score constructed with the average Math score and Verbal score. For students using scores from previous year, we considered the maximum of both averages.
[2] Score constructed with the average grade along high-school.
[3] Score constructed with the relative position of the student among his/her classmates.
[4] Gross Family monthly income in thousands Chilean pesos (nominal).
[5] Partially Subsidized schools.

Appendix C: Tie-Breaking

As discussed in Section 5.3.1, flexible quotas are an alternative to tie-breaking rules such as STB and MTB. However, the comparison between these alternatives is not completely fair, as flexible quotas may end up allocating a higher number of seats due to potential ties. One approach to make the comparison more fair is to increase the number of vacancies used as an input for STB or MTB, emulating the extra vacancies that result from flexible quotas. We consider three different approaches:

1. By program: consider as vacancies the maximum between the original number of seats and the number of students assigned under flexible quotas (for each program).

2. Uniform: consider as vacancies the original number of seats plus the extra seats resulting from flexible quotas uniformly distributed across programs. The re-distribution of extra seats can be

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done by sampling with replacement a number of programs equal to the number of extra seats, and then increasing the vacancies of each sampled program by one.

3. Bootstrap: since the number of extra vacancies that result from flexible quotas is a random variable that depends on the distribution of applications and the distribution of scores, another approach is to estimate the distribution of extra seats that result from flexible quotas, and then run STB or MTB sampling both the random tie-breakers and also the number of extra seats for each program. We implement this approach in two steps:

(a) Estimate the distribution of extra seats for each program and for each admission track using bootstrap, adapting the procedures described in Agarwal and Somaini (2018) and Larroucau and Rios (2019). In particular, for each bootstrap simulation, we sample with replacement a number of students equal to the number of students, along with their application and scores, and we add a random noise to each of their application scores distributed uniformly in the set $\{-0.1, -0.09, \ldots, 0, \ldots, 0.09, 0.1\}$. We use these random noises to prevent from having an excessive number of ties, since the bootstrap procedure is prone to this as it uses students having the same application and scores if no noise is added. Moreover, we choose to sample noises from that subset of values because it leads to a similar expected number of extra vacancies to what we observe under flexible quotas. Then, for each bootstrap simulation and considering the sampled students and their new application scores, we solve the allocation considering flexible quotas. As a result, for each program and each admission track, we obtain a number of extra seats that are allocated due to the flexible quotas, and we store these values.

(b) Simulate the allocations obtained with STB or MTB. To accomplish this, at the beginning of each simulation we sample both the random tie-breakers and the number of extra seats for each program and each admission track (sampling a random simulation from the bootstrap), and then run DA using either STB or MTB.

Our first result is that increasing the number of vacancies by program (option (a)) leads to exactly the same allocation as the one obtained with flexible quotas. This claim is formalized in Proposition 1.

PROPOSITION 1. *For a fixed algorithm (student optimal or university optimal) and a given instance Γ with vector of vacancies $q = \{q_c\}_{c \in C}$, let $\tilde{q} = \{\tilde{q}_c\}$ be the number of seats allocated under flexible quotas, and $\tilde{\mu}(q)$ be the flexible quotas allocation considering as input the vector of vacancies q. In addition, let $\bar{\mu}(q)$ be the allocation obtained considering tie-breaking (STB or MTB) and a vector of vacancies q. Then,*

$$\tilde{\mu}(q) = \bar{\mu}(\tilde{q}).$$

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Proof: We know that DA has a cutoff structure, i.e., the allocation can be obtained from a vector of cutoffs (or score limits) and assigning each student to his/her highest preference among programs for which their application score is greater than or equal to the cutoff (see Biró and Kiselgof (2015)). Let $\{\tilde{s}_c\}$ be the vector of cutoffs that results from using flexible quotas, and let s_{ac} be the application score of student a in program c. Since scores are discrete and flexible quotas admits all students tied in the last place, we know that there is a strictly positive difference between $\tilde{s}_c$ and the application score of the student in the wait-list with the highest score (if no students are in the wait-list we simply assume that this difference is $+\infty$). Let δ be the smallest difference between a program's cutoff and the highest score in the wait-list, i.e.,

$$\delta = \min_{c \in C} \left\{ \tilde{s}_c - s_{ac} : a \in A, \ \tilde{\mu}_a <_a c \right\}.$$

Next, let $\bar{s}_c = \tilde{s}_c - \delta/2$ be a new set of cutoffs. Given the cutoff structure of the flexible quotas algorithm, we know that the allocations obtained given $\{\tilde{s}_c\}_{c \in C}$ and $\{\bar{s}_c\}_{c \in C}$ are exactly the same, since there are no wait-listed students whose score is in $[\bar{s}_c, \tilde{s}_c)$.

Next, suppose that we implement a tie-breaking rule where ties are broken by adding a small enough noise to the application scores. More formally, suppose that the tie-breaking rule considers as application scores $\bar{s}_{ac} = s_{ac} - \epsilon_{ac}$, where $\epsilon_{ac} \sim U[0, \delta/2]$ (this represents MTB, for STB we would sample $\epsilon_a \sim U[0, \delta/2]$, but for the purpose of the proof both are equivalent). By the cutoff structure of DA, we know that the allocation obtained with scores $\{\bar{s}_{ac}\}_{a \in A, c \in C}$ and cutoffs $\{\bar{s}_c\}_{c \in C}$ is equivalent to the allocation obtained under MTB considering as input vacancies $\tilde{q}$ and scores $\{\bar{s}_{ac}\}_{a \in A, c \in C}$. Moreover, this allocation is the same as the one obtained using the original set of scores $\{s_{ac}\}_{a \in A, c \in C}$ by construction. Hence, the allocation obtained from MTB is equivalent to the allocation obtained considering scores $\{s_{ac}\}_{a \in A, c \in C}$ and cutoffs $\{\bar{s}_c\}_{c \in C}$, which is equivalent to the allocation resulting from flexible quotas. $\qquad\square$

On the other hand, if option (b) is implemented, it is possible that the allocation obtained from STB or MTB is different than the one obtained from flexible quotas. In Table 8 we compare the results of 100 simulations that use as input the updated vacancies after distributing the extra seats uniformly across programs.

First, we observe that the number of students that benefit from having flexible quotas is greater than the number of students that are worse off compared to the allocations with tie-breaking and extra seats. In addition, we observe that the total number of students that benefit is smaller than those reported in Table 4. This result was expected, as in this case the allocations with tie-breaking consider more vacancies as input, and thus will obtain a better allocation compared to the case where vacancies are kept fixed.

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Table 8 Impact of Flexible Quotas - Uniform Re-Distribution

	STB			MTB		
	2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
Improvements	77.0	140.2	91.3	77.3	140.9	91.1
	(6.5)	(9.3)	(6.3)	(6.8)	(8.9)	(6.2)
New Assigned	26.9	54.1	44.1	26.7	53.6	44.0
	(2.4)	(3.3)	(2.1)	(2.6)	(3.3)	(2.2)
Total (positive)	103.9	194.4	135.3	104.0	194.5	135.0
	(6.2)	(10.0)	(6.3)	(6.5)	(9.8)	(6.4)
Worsened	34.0	51.8	49.4	34.1	51.9	49.7
	(5.8)	(7.4)	(7.6)	(6.1)	(8.0)	(7.4)
Not Assigned	14.1	29.8	32.0	14.1	29.7	32.0
	(3.0)	(3.8)	(2.1)	(3.0)	(3.7)	(2.1)
Total (negative)	48.1	81.5	81.5	48.3	81.6	81.6
	(7.3)	(10.5)	(6.9)	(7.5)	(11.0)	(6.7)

[1] Comparison of the official assignment (using flexible quotas) with the allocation obtained from 100 simulations using STB and 100 simulations using MTB after re-distributing extra vacancies uniformly across programs. We report average and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the number of students that benefit, separated in four groups: (1) Improvements, for those students that improve their assignment; (2) New Assignments, for those who are assigned under the official assignment but result unassigned using STB/MTB; (3) Worsened, for those students that worsen their assignment (but remain assigned); and (4) Not Assigned, for those who are not assigned under the official assignment but result assigned using STB/MTB. Finally, we also report the total number of students who benefit (Total (positive) = Improvements + New Assigned) and that are worse off (Total (negative) = Worsened + Not Assigned).

The results comparing flexible quotas with STB or MTB, where the latter two include the simulated extra seats obtained from the bootstrap procedure, are reported in Table 9. The first part of the table reports the average and standard deviation for the number of extra seats, the number of programs with extra seats, and the maximum number of extra seats that result from sampling the number of extra seats. The second part of the table reports the mean and standard deviation of the number of students that are benefitted and harmed by using flexible quotas instead of a tie-breaking rule that includes random extra vacancies.

Table 9   Impact of Flexible Quotas - Bootstrap

	STB			MTB		
	2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
Extra Seats	55.3	67.4	70.7	55.3	67.5	70.7
	(7.4)	(9.9)	(8.2)	(7.4)	(9.9)	(8.2)
Programs with extra seats	51.3	61.8	65.9	51.3	61.8	65.9
	(6.7)	(8.1)	(7.6)	(6.7)	(8.1)	(7.6)
Maximum number of extra seats	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3
	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.6)
Improvements	69.1	120.1	80.7	68.2	121.1	81.8
	(6.3)	(13.0)	(9.1)	(6.9)	(12.0)	(8.9)
New Assigned	24.5	47.3	37.2	24.9	46.9	37.8
	(2.7)	(3.8)	(3.0)	(2.6)	(4.1)	(2.7)
Total (positive)	93.6	167.4	117.9	93.1	168.0	119.5
	(7.0)	(15.0)	(10.7)	(6.9)	(13.8)	(10.4)
Worsened	68.0	64.6	85.7	67.7	65.0	85.4
	(13.4)	(13.4)	(14.4)	(12.5)	(13.1)	(15.3)
Not Assigned	20.9	26.6	37.4	21.0	26.4	38.0
	(5.0)	(6.1)	(6.0)	(4.8)	(5.8)	(5.8)
Total (negative)	88.9	91.3	123.1	88.6	91.5	123.4
	(16.0)	(17.1)	(17.0)	(15.1)	(16.7)	(17.7)

[1] Comparison of the official assignment (using flexible quotas) with the allocation obtained from 100 simulations using STB and 100 simulations using MTB after adding extra vacancies obtained from the bootstrap procedure. We report average and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the number of students that benefit, separated in four groups: (1) Improvements, for those students that improve their assignment; (2) New Assignments, for those who are assigned under the official assignment but result unassigned using STB/MTB; (3) Worsened, for those students that worsen their assignment (but remain assigned); and (4) Not Assigned, for those who are not assigned under the official assignment but result assigned using STB/MTB. Finally, we also report the total number of students who benefit (Total (positive) = Improvements + New Assigned) and that are worse off (Total (negative) = Worsened + Not Assigned).

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We observe that using a random tie-breaker with a random number of extra seats leads to similar results than considering the original number of seats and flexible quotas, as the average total number of students who benefit is similar to the average total number of students who are worse off.

Endnotes

1. In Chile, students apply directly to a major in a given university, such as Medicine in the University of Chile. We refer to program as a pair major-university.

2. In addition to what we describe in this paper, each university has special admission programs such as for athletes, racial minorities, among others. In addition, there are other centralized admission tracks that were added to the system in 2017 that we don't address in this paper for simplicity.

3. BEA students should be indifferent between regular and reserved seats because they obtain the scholarship regardless of how they were admitted, and there are no differences between these types of seats.

4. We do not include military and police academies (7).

5. IP and CFT programs tend to be shorter.

6. Some programs such as music, arts and acting, may require additional aptitude tests.

7. The *Consejo de Rectores de las Universidades Chilenas* (CRUCH) is the institution that gathers these universities and is responsible to drive the admission process, while DEMRE is the organism in charge of applying the admission tests and carrying out the assignment of students to programs.

8. Many of these institutions run two admission processes: the first, and most significant in terms of vacancies, is simultaneous to the centralized process, while the second takes place in late July/early August and grants admission for the second semester.

9. Respecting some basic criteria defined by CRUCH.

10. This was directly translated from the document "Normas, Inscripción y Aspectos Importantes del Proceso de Admisión, 2013" CRUCH (2013), page 8.

11. The legal origins of this requirement can be traced back to 1967, when a group of 8 universities decided to change the exam used as part of the admission process (switching from the "Bachillerato"

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to the "Prueba de Aptitud Academica" (PAA), which is the exam that preceded the PSU). As part of the transition, the University of Chile was in charge of implementing the system to process the applications, and as part of the basic requirements they included that "*each student should be evaluated under the same conditions and criteria*". Since then, this rule has been interpreted as equal-treatment of equals, which implies that the system cannot accept one student and reject another one having the same scores, and over the last 20 years this requirement has been included explicitly as part of the rules of the regular and BEA admission processes.

12. Students get a full-refund of the enrollment fees if they decide to decline their enrollment in the first stage to enroll in a new program.

13. To be more precise, the system differentiates between normal and overbooking seats. During the enrollment process, if an admitted student does not enroll then wait-listed students are offered admission only up to the normal vacancies. Hence, only those students who were admitted before the enrollment process can use overbooking seats.

14. In Appendix 6 we compare our results using enrollment data and we show that the inefficiencies introduced by the double assignment are not addressed in the enrollment process.

15. In Appendix 4 we show that the complexity of this procedure is $O(|V|^2)$.

16. Appendices labeled with Arabic numerals can be found in the Electronic Companion, while those labeled with capital letters can be found at the end of the paper.

17. As long as we consider applications as fixed, allowing for ties and flexible quotas will weakly increase the number of seats per program, resulting in a Pareto improvement for students.

18. In this example the student-optimal and the university-optimal algorithms return the same allocation.

19. This group also includes students who participated in the national exam in the previous year.

20. Average between Math and Language.

21. For example, University of Chile requires applicants to apply to at most 4 of its programs, and these applications must be listed within the top 4 positions in the applicant's list.

22. In Appendix 6 we show that these inefficiencies are not eliminated by the enrollment process.

23. In Figure 18 (see Appendix 6) we show that the share of students that enroll after being assigned in one of their 10 listed preferences is decreasing in the number of assigned preference.

24. As an anonymous referee pointed out, this is not necessarily a source of inefficiency. It could be the case that some universities are just willing to enroll more BEA students if they get more applicants than anticipated, but they are not willing to fill that capacity with extra regular students.

25. Under STB every program uses the same random ordering to break ties, while under MTB each program uses its own random order.

26. See Plaza Pública Cadem - Encuesta N 262 - 21 Enero 2019.

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